Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace, Revised and Enlarged Edition
M**S
Nonetheless I recommend this book to anyone remotely intersted in strategy
Very thought inducing and very interesting views. Well worth the read, it ives you unique insights. Negative is that it's bit arrogant and the languge is often bit pretentious and maybe purposefully overcomplicated to make the book seem wiser than it is. Nonetheless I recommend this book to anyone remotely intersted in strategy, military, military history or even politics in general.
B**S
Kindle please
Absolutely essential wisdom, the only thing I don’t like is it isn’t available on kindle, lugging paper around is unnecessary “friction”
W**S
It's not fiction: it's a history of strategic conflict.
It's not a work of fiction- it's a history of strategic conflict.Yes, I learned a lot from it.
G**R
Five Stars
bought as a gift.
P**B
Good for the younger reader, but not especially insightful
Although interesting and in some points insightful, the author of the book principally seems to miss the point of multidimensional strategy. Rather than thinking of strategy as an equation on a multidimensional graph, with defense and offense combining with strengths and weaknesses of opposing forced to produce the best operation, Luttwak seems to view modern strategy and tactics more in linear Napoleonic terms, calling this a paradox. Of course, there is no paradox in this logical endeavor, as the 'social' forces in strategy cannot be said to ever create a true paradox.His understanding of why nations go to war is not particularly insightful (Machiavelli said the same thing five centuries ago) but is well written and intelligent to be an enjoyable read. It would prove very useful for the young reader attempting to discover what strategy is.Luttwak's choice of military events to prove his theory is, of course, circumspect. But whose is not? Hart cherry-picked, as did Clauswitz and every other military strategist. He should not be faulted on this point, as it in no way detracts from the main issue of paradox.The seeming lack of morality on conflict resolution demonstrates a lack of understanding of the necessities of fourth generational war, but does not demonstrate a lack of understanding of basic strategy or a lack of ethics. The subject of abstract strategy deserves ethics no more than the study of abstract math. Nevertheless, since the creation of the near real time war correspondent, it is impossible to consider war without considering public morality. The concentration camps of the British in the Boer War were effective. The complete and utter annihilation of Carthage also was effective. But both would now be untenable positions. Luttwik does not offer an answer for the European power at war about what to do to win a war. His lack of an answer for the paradox would by necessity eliminate the answer.The book raises insightful questions and forces the reader the question his own assumptions about strategy, never a bad thing. Although ultimately a failure on the overriding theme, everything else to do with this book makes it enjoyable, and worth reading.
J**N
A provocative look at the essence of strategy
Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace makes for stimulating reading. Luttwak's chief argument is that strategy is conditioned by its own paradoxical logic. For example, according to the logic, any success contains the seeds of its own reversal. Thus, a highly successful weapon will soon be rendered less effective by the enemy's efforts to design countermeasures. Although much of Luttwak's ideas come from Clausewitz, the concepts are taken to a much further extreme, which results in very different conclusions. Overall, the book is well-written and readers interested in strategy will find it a must. The first section of the book (60 pgs.) outlines the main concept and is the most interesting part.
R**H
Highly recommended for science fiction writers
Although it especially helped me write my military science fiction novel, Take the Shilling , any fiction writer, whether focused on science fiction or not, would benefit from considering Luttwak's main thesis. In any strategic contest, (a situation where two directing minds pursue incompatible goals), a straightforward course of "best" action followed by one side will bring out responses from an opponent, thus negating the advantage of the "best" action, if not outright reversing it to the opponent's favor. Since essentially every story worth reading is about a strategic contest, the applicability to fiction writers should be apparent. Further, Luttwak's discussion of relational maneuver--the application of one side's strengths against the opponent's weakness--has relevance to writers trying to craft fresh, unexpected plots, while leaving out the parts readers skip. (Hint: in military parlance, those parts are "attrition.")Turning to sf writers, Luttwak raises two points they should especially consider. First, many an sf story involves an ultimate technology, a technology to end history, which gives its first wielder an insurmountable and eternal advantage. (H.G. Wells' "The Land Ironclads" is one of the first, but nowhere near the last). Luttwak's discussion of the levels of strategy, working up from the technical to the tactical, operational, theater, and grand-strategic levels, with all the ways a technically "best" action can be negated by an opponent, demolishes the "technology that ends history" subgenre of sf.Second, wise strategic thinking takes into account the workings of the opponent's mind, and because we have incomplete intelligence and understanding of our opponents, wars break out more often than they would in a world of perfect knowledge. When writing about strategic contests involving non-human minds, whether aliens, robots, or something else, the greater difficulty to understanding such minds suggests armed suasion would be less predictable, war more likely to break out, and peace even more of a worthy achievement.
A**Y
Luttwak, rather late for the Cold war. Still absorbing.
A fascinating view of and approach to strategy. Critical to moving beyond the "who did what to whom and how" school of military history because it gives you a structure permitting you to investigate "why".Luttwak's quite wrong about some trivial historical issues and misses some opportunities to reinforce his points with others, none of this detracts from a most valuable book.I wish this had been on the Birmingham WW-I MA course reading list.
S**N
Its a great scholarly work where theory underpins the narrative
This is a first class book. Its a great scholarly work where theory underpins the narrative, backed by empirical facts. its lucid, well written and a a necessary read for the professional scholar as well as the subject enthusiast.
R**O
Autor consagrado na área de Estudos Estratégicos!
Excelente livro! Autor consagrado e que aborda muito bem a estratégia da guerra com abordagem feita levando em consideração conflitos contemporâneos.
宗**宏
古今の基本的な戦略が整理されている
国家と国家の紛争解決の手段として様々な戦略が整理され説明されている。 戦争の戦略論であり、企業戦略の役に立つかというと、ごくごく抽象化しないとそうはならないので、ご注意を。 何か特別な戦略論が展開されているかというと、そうではなく、非常にオーソドックスな思考方法で述べているように感じる。 日本が戦った太平洋戦争については紙数は多くないものの、敗れた原因は、明快に書かれている。 但し、英語は難解で、ジャーナリストの書いた本などとは随分と趣が異なる。 翻訳本の訳についての難点の指摘が多いが、さもありなんとも思う。
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