Lost Victories: The War Memoirs of Hitler's Most Brilliant General [Illustrated Edition] Kindle Edition

The five stars is for what it is supposed to be-- a detailed military memoir by an exceptional leader of German armed forces. Manstein was by any judgment a first rate staff officer, who excelled with troops and shone in use of combined force tactics and strategy on a large scale. His impact in WWII was immense -- on both the Western and Eastern Front.He was also convicted for war crimes and served four years of an 18 year sentence noted in a 1981 introduction. That is not noted in the original edition which I also have. He was not a political general, i.e. he was not a Nazi Party member and had long credentials as a professional soldier and offspring of professional soldiers. He had Hitler's ear frequently and stood up to him more than most. Evidence (from other sources) indicated that one of his orders referred to a need to eliminate "Jewish Bolshevism" once and for all. There's no point in retrying his case here,but it does affect the way some of his writing is interpreted. Some of his comments should be read knowing that he had only recently been released from prison.Manstein had a stellar reputation before the war, although he angered some old guard when he waffled on a plan to confront Hitler. In a critical phase at the opening of the war, he was chief of staff to von Rundstedt and took part in military planning. Some of his innovative proposals were passed over.As the Germans planned their attack into France, the Belgians captured some of the Fall Gelb, or Code Yellow plans, essentially another revision of the basic Schlieffen used in WWI. The allies were pleased because it confirmed their basic planning in reaction to such an invasion. The Germans, however, knew that the Allies knew. So the plan was revised again. Rundstedt and Manstein had already been pushing for the plan.An interview was arranged with Hitler. Manstein describes a HItler who was engaged, understood the concepts and had an excellent grasp on technology. Manstein immediately by memo recounted Hitler's agreement with his plan and the final order included its elements. No military plan for large troop movements is ever simple. A critical element in Manstein's plan was sending a major force with tanks through the Ardennes, something thought too difficult. If the plans early phases were successful, the Allies would have little chance to recover.He and most authorities credit the Ardennes drive, orchestrated by Rundstedt and Guderian and not without difficulty, as the major factor in the utter defeat of the Allies in Northern Belgium. Germany held back its armor, leaving mopup to infantry and aircraft. That allowed the evacuation of nearly 340-thousand troops including 26,000 French to be evacuated. Manstein cites three possible reasons; Goring's egoand m aking peace with Britain were two. The third is currently considered the most likely, that Hitler acceded to his generals who wanted to save their armor for the second phase of the French campaign.As Manstein points out, despite the loss of their equipment, the success of the the Dunkirk evacuation later allowed Brittish troops to fight in Africa and Italy. Despite all the success, Manstein thought more could have been achieved. It is here that he sums up Hitler's ultimate weakness, one that worsened. HItler had a firm grasp of operational problems, but lacked the professional training to know when large risks should be accepted.In part because Americans have developed a self-righteous attitude abouut all things French, it's worth repeating Manstein's comment that even had better judgment and energy been shown, the French would have still been destroyed/defeated. Manstein's 38 Corps played a minor role in the battle for France.Manstein deals in detail with the rivalries and factions as Germany turned toward Britain and an invastion in a "between campaigns chapter. After the decision was made to invade Russsia instead of Britain, Manstein moved to 56 Panzer Corps as commander in the early phase Panzer Dash. He praises the quality of the Waffen SS troops and termss it a terrible mistake to have set them up as a separate military organization. He argues that their casualties were disproportionate to their gains ... and that they drained the Army of potential NCOs.Manstein's victory in the Crimea and the annihilation of a powerful Soviet force --Freeing up the 11th Army -- was in his high water mark. He was made field marshal -- and Hitler soon ordered him to take his Army to join the seige of Leningrad, but having had little effect in tthe ill-advised move, Hitler ordered 11 Army to begin moving south again. By this time, Manstein had lost some close associates and his oldest son had been killed and he was shortly named commander of the Don Army Group.Although a Hitler favorite for being a winner, Manstein had not previously reported directly to Hitler. He comments until that point he had felt Hitler's influence on the military only indirectly and from far away. That changed. In the 50s, it had already been fashionable to blame Hitler for everything and he became a cartoon character.Manstein puts a different light on a much more complex man but the end result is no more favorable to Hitler. His analysis of Hitler as strategist and warlord is complex and far reachingg. There is a chapter dedicated to "Hitler as Supreme Commander" including his adoption of Stalin's strategy of holding on to every piece of ground.From this point, Manstein's tale (amid some triumphs) is on a downward trajectory. Stalingrad. Another winter in South Russia and the defensive battles of 1943 and 1944. Manstein drives close enough to encircled Stalingrad to make a breakout possible, but Hitler orders it held at all costs. Paulus and his army are lost and the relief is in vain.The lost victories, those won and those that could have been won, are adding up. But Hitler rejects every plan that might bring victory or at least a stalemate. German troops continue to inflict fearsome casualties on the Russians, The quality of their troops kept declining, but there were always more. This is not a technical book, but it is dense with military thought and considered criticism of Hitler. It must all be in a context. It is one man's view -- and one that is considered by military historians.It will probably be in print as long as there is a military.While HItler would not have used the phrase "Stay the Course" but he said the equivalent in idiom Except that he didn't want to talk to anyone and began isolating himself.When people saw him, he lashed out.He made the mistake and everyone else paid the price. The shame is that it still continues. I cannot regret these lost victories any more than I can wish that my native South had won that war. It's probably a coincidence but still ironic that a new book about Stonewall Jackson is called "Lost Victories.It is possible to understand the pangs of lost victories ... without wishing for a change in result.What is more difficult is to understand why wars that cannot be won are fought -- why the course must be stayed -- why criticism of the leadership is so bad. If the best Germany could hope to achieve against the Soviet Union, planning for that should have started before millions of people lost their lives -- for nothing.Manstein makes the point well, that just because the political arm can order something does not make it right or wise. From a Nazi general yet!

I have read dozens of German WWII memoirs. Lost Victories is perhaps the most difficult to rate. It is both hugely insightful and heavily sanitized. It’s as dense as it is fascinating. Manstein himself is at times so compelling I nearly found myself falling for his self-serving revisionism. All of it makes for great reading.Let it be said: Lost Victories is not for the uninitiated layman. It assumes readers already have a strong understanding of the campaigns in the East and the conditions under which they were fought. Though Manstein describes some operations in great detail, he limits his commentary to engagements over which he had direct control. Anyone lacking the “big picture” will thus be confused and disappointed.If, on the other hand, you’re already an Eastern Front aficionado, Lost Victories is compulsory reading. The highlight of the memoir is Manstein’s insight into Hitler’s leadership, psychology, temperament, and strengths and weaknesses as the commander in chief of the German war machine. Though his assessment of Hitler is decidedly critical, Manstein offers praise where appropriate and explains Hitler’s strategic gaffes as charitably as possible rather than gunning him down with charges of incompetence and narcissism, as many others have done. I found his appraisal thoughtful, sober, and convincing.Manstein’s principal failure in Lost Victories is his heavy sanitization of, well, everything. In my estimation, it is not necessary for every Wehrmacht veteran to speak on matters related to the Holocaust. Many frontline soldiers played no part in it. But Erich von Manstein isn’t some run-of-the-mill grunt. He was a corps commander in 1941 and, after his promotion to Field Marshal in 1942, an army group commander until his dismissal in 1944. As such, I consider it a significant sin not to address Einsatzgruppen activities in conquered Soviet territory—activities which Manstein himself supported militarily in the Crimea in 1941.Likewise, Manstein claims to have disobeyed Hitler’s Commissar Order, dismissing it as foolhardy. He said the same thing at Nuremberg but was proven to have received regular reports about the execution of Soviet political officers. Manstein even has the audacity to complain that the Germans didn’t pillage French treasures half so badly as the Allies later did to the Germans. Indeed, it seems he would have us believe all that stolen art just grew legs and hopped the Rhine!Be wary of Manstein’s silver tongue while reading, for he’s as crafty a spinster as he is omitting the darker parts of his career. One leaves Lost Victories with the distinct impression that had Hitler and his yes-men gotten out of the way, Manstein might’ve won Germany the war—or at least fought the Soviets to a draw. Is it possible? Maybe. Some of his arguments are quite powerful. But I advise approaching Lost Victories critically. Whether Manstein was, in fact, “Hitler’s most brilliant general,” as the book’s subtitle proclaims, he certainly wants you to think so.I must voice a few additional stylistic complaints. For one, there aren’t nearly enough maps. I’m not sure why so many memoirs are deficient in this regard, but you’ll find yourself supplementing with regular Google searches. Second, the chapter on the 1943 winter retreat is interminable. It could have been reduced by a third and I’d still have the full picture. Considering it’s almost a hundred pages long, I don’t understand why Manstein devoted so much space to such a repetitive operation other than to laud himself for saving the day. Finally, a translator’s note reveals that numerous personal anecdotes were removed from this English edition due to its length. I’m curious how much space was saved considering Lost Victories is still 550+ pages. Moreover, personal anecdotes typically help move the narrative along. I’d have greatly appreciated that midway through the aforementioned winter retreat chapter. If an unabridged English edition of Lost Victories exists, I recommend purchasing that instead.Nevertheless, with all my criticisms in mind, I still consider Lost Victories essential reading for any serious student of the Eastern Front. Manstein is as talented a writer as he was a general; it was a thrill to see the war through his eyes. Provided you periodically remind yourself of his agenda, it’s not to be missed.

The author's cunning mind stands out through the reading of his book (mostly a whitewashing of Nazi guilt and his failed operations). The first part of the book is interesting and well written, after gaining that credibility from the reader the author spends about half of the book (some 250 pages of it) finding excuses for his failure to reach the Stalingrad pocket or refusing to accept the job in the first place, since he himself states the minimum conditions for viability were not gathered, and whitewashing the regular army (and so the forces under his command) responsibility in war crimes and crimes against Humanity.The description of the taking of Sevastopol (one of his successful operations) is very good and useful (he didn't have to hide or distort facts to evade guilt).There are also several gullible excerpts in the book that the author would have done better leaving out: when he purports to have been extremely brave and standing up to Hitler when he didn't agree with his orders. Unfortunately, cross examination of his statements with other testimonies does not corroborate that. As far as I can say, after having read some 80 book about the WWII, he was never one of the "rebels".It's an understandable posture, though, since he was involved in war crimes and crimes against Humanity and so would rather try to avoid responsibility (like 95% of other Nazis) than admit anything.There are, thus to interesting sides to the book: the guilt avoidance methods used by Nazis after the war, the excuses and posture taken up and the historical side of the war, meaning troop movement, orders, difficulties, developments (though in here, every time you enter into an area where the author will have his public image affected, you will encounter flimsy excuses and distorted descriptions of events).

Highly readable, with no attempt to shift the blame for anything. Manstein does blame Hitler for some things of course and rightly so, but this is far from being an exercise in self exculpation. He writes it from his own perspective as it happened. Interestingly, Manstein engages in some counter factual history too (what ifs), which, coming from one of those involved, is very interesting indeed. He was a man of war, of course, but he was also a man of honour and courage, who might have been even more successful if he hadn't angered the big boss. This is a highly intelligent and literate account from a highly intelligent and educated man. Superb.

Indispensible for the serious WW2 military student, as is also Gen. Guderian's memoires of tank warfare. As another reviewer has pointed out, written with sub-agenda's in mind, the principle one being the unsuitability of Adolf Hitler as military chief. This itself is an interesting and controversial topic and GFM v. Manstein makes his points very well on it.Highlights for me were his gripping description of the Crimea campaign, account of Stalingrad/6th Army, also the intricacies/timing of the retreat from Donetz to Dnieper (plus interesting "what-if's" on the proposed construction of an Ostwall etc). The book is overall so good I might change these selections after re-reading... I also was disappointed by his brief coverage of Zitadelle/Citadel but found a satisfactory substitute in "Blood, Steel and Myth" by George M. Nipe.

A superb book from one of the great Field Marshalls. The shortcomings are a little too much detail re. the Caucusas disaster and no mention of his time spent following his dismissal. perhaps we might have read about the Nuremburg trials also.

To enhance the knowledge I already have and learn new facts about an incredible military figure, which includes the war & beyond.