The Quiet Americans: Four CIA Spies at the Dawn of the Cold War - a Tragedy in Three Acts

This is a fascinating book which examines our nascent intelligence agency efforts through four individuals who played key roles in both the OSS and CIA.The first part of the book is more thrilling and action packed than the latter. The four protagonists are OSS operatives undertaking field missions in Europe and the Philippines. These four succeeded impressively in high risk operations that claimed a lot of lives - spies are usually killed (after often being tortured) if unsuccessful. Their missions read like well written spy novels.The second half of the book drags in comparison as the four participants ascend to operations management and policy positions in our national intelligence agency. There are still some field stories, but much of the story at this point is about policy issues and bureaucratic struggles as field operations are planned, implemented and debated. What sticks out is how we were had by the Soviets in the aftermath of WWII and in the 1950s. Falling victim to believing what we wished to believe, our side sent countless agents to behind-the-lines resistance groups only to have them disappear after short periods or never make contact once in-country. These groups were all a Soviet ruse to attract agents and provocateurs. We were had very well by the KGB. We learned and got better, but the early efforts underscored American newness to the spying game. We did have better luck in the Philippines during this period.American overreach with Iran and Guatemala are parts of this story. I agree with those who in retrospect criticize our meddling in the governments of these two countries and in reality destroying regimes that would have in all likelihood served our interests better in the long term if we hadn't been so very paranoid over the Communist threat. Not by way of excusing, but by explanation, the decisions made by Eisenhower and their officials was informed by experiencing Soviet subversion and atrocities first hand in the aftermath of WWII in Eastern Europe. They unfortunately reacted to what they feared and worst-case scenarios where watching and waiting and engagement would have been much more to our advantage. Same for Kennedy and his crew with Vietnam.All in all this is a fascinating book that opens a window on the beginnings and development of what became the CIA.

This book was a terrific read. While it doesn't break new ground for anyone already familiar with the CIA's early struggles with the Soviets, the overthrow of Mossadegh in Iran, the coup in Guatemala and our misadventures in Vietnam, it narrows the focus from the global to the personal, into planning rooms and secret cables, the personalities of four spies who made history, and the limits put upon them by their superiors and the era of anti-communism fervor.Part of what made such a good page-turning read was that the lives of the four men profiled - especially Ed Landsdale and Michael Burke - were so dashing and adventurous as to seem out of Hollywood.But the real story, and the tragedy, is how reflexive anti-communist paranoia, Red Scare reactionism and bureaucratic self-serving led America to not only miss opportunities to dramatically shorten the Cold War, but led it to abandon allies, alienate potential allies, and betray our own principles of self government in the developing world - mistakes the US and the world are still paying for dearly. We would very likely not, for instance, be currently at dangerous odds with Iran in 2021, had we not overthrown Mossadegh in '53. Who knows what kinds of governments there might be in Central America today had we not been so busy overthrowing popularly elected leaders and replacing them with right wing tyrants in the name of keeping the hemisphere safe from communism.This is a really good book, a combination of the wide lens history and on the ground, hinge of history decision making which made up the early CIA and much of our relations with the world today.

“The Quiet Americans” is a gripping account of the early days of the Cold War told through the lives of four CIA “spies.” Scott Anderson spins a brilliant, captivating, and detailed story but often allows a liberal bias to mar his analysis. In my opinion, each of these four men – Michael Burke, Edward Landsdale, Peter Sichel, and Frank Wisner – are heroic, albeit flawed, Cold War warriors with a high sense of duty. The author displays an intimate knowledge of events and has obviously done his homework in this damning indictment of U.S. foreign policy and approach to the Cold War.Having grown up during the Cold War with 30 years of service as a field artilleryman with 13 years overseas including a combat tour in Vietnam and two tours with DIA as a defense attaché, the book touched me on several levels. I could easily relate to the four main characters – especially Frank Wisner Sr. since I had served with his son, Frank Wisner Jr., in New Delhi in the mid-90s when I was the defense attaché and he was the ambassador. And, I can attest that the son was a chip off the old block.“The Quiet Americans” will be of interest to older readers who possess some knowledge of the events of the Cold War. I would not recommend as a basic primer on the Cold War to someone who is not familiar with the stakes involved in the late 1940s and 1950s.A few comments on content and style:• The use of the word “spies” in the title is a bit of hyperbole. Most CIA officers who work overseas are referred to as “case officers” who manage / direct indigenous assets who are the actual spies.• When referring to a specific country’s army, “army” should be capitalized.• The author states that “atomic bombs were just another tactical weapon in the nation’s arsenal.” Nuclear weapons are strategic weapons not tactical.• In several instances, the chronology of the writing was hard to follow / discern.• The author gives a scathing denunciation of the U.S. concerning the Hungarian Revolution, but I fail to see what the U.S. government could have done. How could we have gotten aid to the rebels? Hungary had not border with any NATO country.• The author’s “Notes” section is an unusual and unique manner of providing references in place of footnotes but was practically useless.

The quiet Americans is a vivid story of the first ten years of the cold war, between the surrender of Nazi Germany in 1945 to the end of the first term of the Eisenhower presidency in 1956. At the end of WWII, the Soviet Union affirmed its grip on the countries of eastern Europe while the liberal democracies of western Europe sought the protection of the US. In Asia, after the surrender of Japan, the decline of the British, Dutch, and French empire, and the collapse of the nationalist Kuo Min Tang in China led to a very unstable situation. The OSS, that had conducted both covert operations and intelligence gathering during the war, had the experience to address the new challenges of the armed peace. It became the CIA despite the furious opposition of FBI’s director J. Edgar Hoover. To face the real or imaginary challenges from the Soviet Union, the US government oscillated between strategies of containment and roll-back.The story is told through the personal experiences of four remarkable agents who, at different levels of responsibility, led operations in different regions of the world. In Europe, containment did not exclude the execution of suicide missions behind the iron curtain and even deep inside the Soviet Union with the participation of Nazi collaborators. In the meantime, airwave propaganda called for insurrections in people’s democracies, but the US had no intention to support them, ending in the bloodbath of the 1956 Hungarian revolution. In the Far East, the communists came to power in China after the collapse of the corrupt Kuo Min Tang. More significantly, the communists supported nationalist insurrections against the old colonial powers. The defeat of a communist led insurrection in the Philippines gave the illusion that insurrections could be defeated. But history would tell different! With strong American support, the French fought and lost the first war of Indochina. The Americans came to replace them and chose intransigence. We know the rest … Following the hard line of secretary of state John Foster Dulles, the CIA was led to treat neutralists as enemies, and to stage coups against democratic governments throughout South America and the rest of the world.By 1956, these agents were bitter and disillusioned. They had sent men to their deaths for no good reason, and ultimately betrayed their ideals. One of them committed suicide. The others left the agency to start a new more innocent life!I enjoyed this very readable book. It shows the action at ground level, which is fine, but it does not explain the decisions that were taken at the top level of the US government and how decisions were made. It leaves a strong impression that a lot was left to improvisation and that the intelligence agency provided little intelligence.The author does not try to hide his own biases. He is entitled to them, but it is irritating. For instance, he never misses an occasion to put down George Kennan. He seems to have instinctive loathing of the French. At least, the book does not leave the reader indifferent!

A very interesting and informative study on the beginnings of the CIA, seen through the careers of four early officials.

Fascinating non-fiction exposé about origins of CIA and the political machinations of senior US politicians obsessed by the Soviet Union.

The author shows developments in the early years of the CIA, using four key players. A few of them had served in the OSS during WWII. The CIA tried covert actions in Poland, but withoutr much success. A number of these programs were started from german soil. The government in Bonn sometimes did not know what the CIA was trying to achieve.A interesting book, bringing light to an era when the cold ware was still hot.

Confirms what I’ve always suspected. We Yanks are a well-meaning but over-resourced, blind, often inept bunch. Malicious? Perhaps not, but wilfully myopic, yes. We have much to answer for, and have never been at greater risk of not making good on or undoing the vast damage we have wrought...