Five Days in London, May 1940

The author's premise, correctly stated from the book, is that Hitler never came closer to winning his European war than at the end of May, 1940.A newly installed Prime Minister, Churchill, was presented with: France on the verge of defeat, the BEF bottled up on the coast at Dunkirk, no allies on the horizon once France was gone, an aristocracy that had some members who admired and/or feared Hitler, and a Conservative majority in Parliament which at that point tolerated is presence rather than enthusiastically embracing him.The War Cabinet, Churchill and four other senior members of the cabinet, had to decide whether or not to fight it out no matter what, or inquire of Hitler upon what terms he would allow England to survive. That is at least how Lord Halifax saw the options. Churchill was resolute from the beginning -- any hint try at accommodation would lead to the eventual destruction of Britain and cement the Nazi map of Europe in place.The five days in question follow a long debate among the cabinet, or chiefly among Churchill and Halifax, regarding the issue of whether or not to advance an overture to Hitler. Chamberlain played some role, usually siding with Churchill as the discussions progresssed, but holding the balance of power none the less.Why is this debate important? Well, with the clarity offered by hindsight, it is now easy to appreciate that any attempt at purchasing peace from Hitler would have only meant a thus weakened Britain would have been added to the Third Reich later. In the spring of 1940, serious people seriously discussed this acquiescence strategy in London. If that strategy had been followed, it is possible that the English government of the time could have lost the war for civilization. Thus, the author's important point is correct. During this period -- this hinge of history -- Churchill did not lose the war -- and thus deserves history's gratitude.Why did Churchill simply not force the issue? For several reasons. He was in the PM's chair only a fortnight -- the second choice of the King and the Conservative Party (Halifax, the first choice, had turned it down requiring one to appreciate either his selfless patriotism, divine intervention, or some combination of both). It was probable that a major disagreement within the War Cabinet would have brought him down and proved disasterous for public morale. In addition, any public hint that the War Cabinet was even thinking about an accommodation of Hitler would have quite likely retarded the English people's will to resist. (I can state from personal experience in assuming a political leadership role at the head of a divided caucus that in the beginning one must build political capital until a point is reached where decisive action can be taken by the leader because it will be supported, even it the decision proves costly or presents great difficulty.)Churchill had the wisdom to know that his only choice in making the right choice (ie, rejecting accommodation and fighting to the end), required his moving the War Cabinet decisively behind his position through personal diplomacy and moral suasion. Churchill proved to be a master of this technique (interesting to view because he is remembered publicly for his defiant and blustery leadership, but he was quite the canny politico, too).This book tells the tale in an interesting way. Each day is a chapter. The War Cabinet meeting summaries are nicely interspersed with background discussions of the participants, an overview of the political and military situations and a daily reading of public opinion (as gleaned from an early survey technique employed by the government and some newspaper and diary accounts). I would have preferred more discussion of the cabinet sessions and thought the daily public opinion discussion could have been discarded. However, this is a neat little book that should be of interest to any WWII devotee or political science student. The author does a good job and makes his case well regarding the decisiveness of this time period for human history.

Author John Lukacs has written several books on England and Churchill and WWII; there is even a joke included that his next work may be something like 30 minutes in May.This book is an analysis of personality, and also foresight and judgment of events as they were unfolding. People know Churchill will win his legacy here, so readers must tune in to certain words, phrases, actions, letters, wires, the directions not given or taken in France. The force of Churchill's personality and intelligence are key, as he was coming out of political isolation and still kind to Chamberlain. One of the most underated measures of Churchill's character, as well as dedication to the British Empire, is his short memory with the Conservatives.

I do not think in the history of the West, has it been as easy to point to such dramatic turning points, of the rising and falling of many, as the five days in London from May 24 through May 28th, 1940. From the perspective of over 70 years now, I think it is easy to just assume that the events that have happened since then - the winning over fascism, the ascendancy of the West over the communist bloc (led by America and Britain), even the lives that have lived in many cities and towns and their countless opportunities and choices. But what Lukacs has done in this work is to show how decisions made by so few, in such a small space changed the world largely for the better.Five Days reads like a drama. Lukacs has an introduction, setting the scene in late May of 1940, the dire situation of so many continental European nations falling to NAZI Germany, leading to the march on Paris itself. He then spends a chapter on each day. He closes with a conclusion, showing the immediate effects of the decisions, particularly on morale and military achievement.What should strike the reader here is the very small geography of this book - essentially the City of Westminster, the high government offices in London, and the relatively small cast of characters. I think the author makes the case well that so few people were involved here, that the reader can grasp the personalities involved, and see the consequences of why people acted like they did.The reader will come away with the lingering wariness of conflict from the British Conservative party, particularly from the King's favorite, Lord Halifax. The real conflict of this drama is between Churchill, who had just surprisingly become Prime Minister and who was regarded with real wariness by the Conservative leadership, and Halifax. Also, the reader will understand a bit of the native, grassroots British character, and why it did not collapse in the face of real pressure from Germany.The reader should come away with a great lesson in how leadership, consensus and turning opinion are done, particularly at the high government level, through a fog of seemingly contradictory information.Understanding the real hinge of fate here, the reader should come away with why World War II was fought the way it was, from this point forward, and why an Empire stood against a new pagan tyranny, largely based on its character.

Great detail - a most interesting read

A very detailed account of a significant period in history and the decisions which needed to be made in the backrooms of the British Government by those in power.

Nonetheless enjoyable, but for those of us who have studied that period of detail, he was not actually telling us anything we did not know already., just in more detail.All roads lead to Rome. Even if an agreement had been proposed with the Axis, it would have been voted down in parliament. They would never have stood for it, because Churchill was not the only one who knew what an agreement with the Axis would have meant for us, and so did the people of this Country .Churchill would have resigned other than propose it, which the cabinet would never have accepted anyway, so neither Chamberlain or Halifax would have had their way.

Lukacs is an interesting historian with a distinctive style. He shines another light on why Churchill decided against negotiating a peace agreement with Germany, although Poland could not be rescued and Britain's own defences were far from secure, especially after the unexpectedly rapid collapse of France. He reveals however that Churchill briefly considered the Hitler-fan Lloyd George as a possible peace leader as an alternative to Oswald Mosley, who was then imprisoned without charge or trial just after stating that his British Union in the event of an enemy landing would be at the disposal of the government in driving in the Nazi invaders from our soil! One would like to see Lukacs, who has also written a good book on the sad outcome of WW2, examine the long forgotten and largely unknown efforts to impede the Allied war effort made by the Communists in Britain, America, France, Belgium and China during the Russo-German Pact. Churchill ruefully remarked after the war that we faced "even worse" perils from the USSR and "perhaps we had killed the wrong pig".

It has taken me 66 years to become aware of the extent of the debt that I owe to Churchill. This truly great leader, under the most unimaginable pressure, was not only the saviour of our nation but of the whole of Europe. And if you believe this to be a gross overstatement then remember this - during 1940 the heads of almost every country in Europe were taking refuge in England whilst Hitler was driving all before him. With no help forthcoming from Roosevelt the United Kingdom were the only country standing between Hitler and total domination of Europe. And the man to thank for that, the only man to thank for that, was Winston Churchill. He would ultimately be supported by the magnificent spirit and resilience of the British people, never more evident than when they have their backs to the wall and when all appears lost 'there was a white glow that spread from one end of the nation to the other'. How different our lives would have been had Churchill bowed to the purveyors of appeasement. A superbly written book and one that everyone should read.