Alamein Paperback – July 1, 2003

A classic account of one of the most decisive battles of World War Two.Illustrated with many good black and white photos.well written analysis of the battle by noted military historian Stephen Bungay.Recommended for anyone with an interest in military history and World War Two.

Bungay is excellent on the logistical difficulties that accompany war in a vast and inhospitable desert. He sees the strategic importance of Malta. He explores the hardships of desert life for the soldiers on all sides: A plague of flies, poor food, and resulting sickness. Sand is and also very hard on truck, tank and aero engines. The book is not long and extremely well written, leaving us much to ponder in the way of human folly and tenacity.

It's just one book but it fills many holes and answers many questions I had about history.

As with "The Most Dangerous Enemy" Mr. Bungay looks for the reasons why a battle is won or lost in other parts such a logistics, supply, training, chain of command, etcetera. It is a very good change from the typical books where all the success or failure is charged upon the fighting soldiers. This book shows how a battle outcome is very much decided before starting

Well written, thoroughly researched objective analysis of of the war with detailed information on the major leaders. Detailed information from other publications with attributes.

The book looked at Alamein from various angles, what worked what didn't. The assessment of the various characters personality was most interesting, specifically Montgomery and Rommel. I can understand why Rommel was respected generally. Interesting that he was implicated (incorrectly) in a plot to kill Hitler and was required to take his own life. Both men had a "Christian" orientation and perspective. Rommel saw his fate in Gods hands, Montgomery had a harsh school master view of God.I read it after seeing the documentary on the ABC...

Successful modern business strategist Stephen Bungay previously brought his formidable analytical skills to examine the Battle of Britain in his impressive book ‘The Most Dangerous Enemy’, a defining work in understanding that important historical conflict.In this shorter work about the desert campaign culminating in the Battle of El Alamein, Bungay once again brings his intelligent analytical mind to examine the conflict from perspectives focussed not only on the battlefield, the armies and their equipment, but on the political and strategic hinterland governing the motives and actions of the various participants.Of inestimable importance, the author illustrates, is the big picture. Hitler saw the Mediterranean theatre as a sideshow to his invasion of the USSR, sent the Deutsches Afrika Korps (DAK) under Rommel to Libya to prevent Mussolini suffering the humiliation of total defeat at the hands of the British Commonwealth forces, and simply wanted ‘not to lose.’ The DAK never received sufficient resources or supplies to finish off the British forces because British warships, submarines and aircraft based in Malta were sinking their supply ships all the time, and when the DAK reached Alamein their supply tail was too long and continuously harassed by the allied air forces. The Panzerarmee Afrika which comprised roughly even numbers of German and Italian forces – fundamentally unsuited as allies – were unable to invade Egypt and occupy Cairo and Alexandria partly because of these factors (and partly Auchinleck’s skilled defensive battle). Occupying Cairo was not something Hitler was enthusiastic about, though Mussolini greeted the prospect with great relish and looked forward to riding into Cairo on a white horse as ‘The Conqueror of Egypt.’Churchill by contrast wanted to win in North Africa and dominate the Mediterranean, rather than just ‘not lose’ and was never content with a stalemate. There were important strategic and political reasons for fighting and winning the battle at Alamein, which the 8th Army did not need to fight for military reasons because the ‘Torch’ landings would have ultimately led to Rommel being attacked from the west by overwhelming allied forces and having his supply lines severed. The battle had to be fought and won to prove that the British Army could defeat an equivalent German Army fighting under a German general; to rebuild the 8th Army’s confidence as ‘winners’. Stalin on the one side, and the Americans on the other, also needed to be convinced that Britain was an effective ally with a hard-fighting army which could comprehensively defeat the Wehrmacht in the field on its own. Secondly, the victory was needed to secure Churchill’s position at home, as by 1942 his conduct of the war was being criticised and he had already faced a censure motion in Parliament. Churchill certainly made the most of the victory: after November 1942 his position as PM was never challenged until the 1945 election.The early chapters cover the strategic war; the tactical war - with an enlightening examination of the different command styles of the Italian, British and German forces, the latter with their ‘Mission Command’ philosophy proving superior on the battlefield; the supply war with a long and detailed section about the importance of Malta which the Axis forces planned to invade (and needed to) but never did; and an excellent chapter ‘The Soldiers’ War’ redolent of the author’s incisive no-holds-barred analysis of aircrew experiences in ‘The Most Dangerous Enemy.’The personality issues between the Germans and Italians, between Kesselring and Rommel, between the British commanders in charge of Malta’s air defences and between Montgomery and almost everyone, are dealt with by the author with skill and insight. Bungay is a thorough researcher who wherever possible goes back to original sources - like Rommel’s letters to his wife Lucie for example, which are continuously quoted in the book. An examination of the governing philosophies of the two opposing air forces is also very illuminating. The Desert Air Force focussed resources in support of the ground troops by attacking the enemy’s formations and supply columns; the MO of the Luftwaffe’s fighter arm in contrast was that everything operationally should feed the objective of upping the kill scores of a handful of ‘Ace’ pilots in order to feed Goebbels’ propaganda machine for civilian morale-boosting, so the RAF’s bombers attacking Rommel’s troops were left largely unmolested (“the bombers had tail gunners”). The RAF therefore proved incomparably more effective both strategically and tactically, and although the Me109F was superior in every way to Hurricanes and American lend-lease P40s, it was the RAF who eventually gained air superiority and ensured the ground victory was decisive.Montgomery might have never emerged from relative obscurity had the transport plane carrying Gott (the initial appointee as 8th Army commander) not been shot down, killing him with others on board. The choice of Monty to replace Gott was greeted by Churchill with scepticism. Bungay does not lionise Monty and is fully aware of his notoriously ‘difficult’ side, but explains where these attitudes originated and demonstrates convincingly that he was exactly what the 8th Army needed at the time. Most importantly Monty recognised that British troops often referred to the DAK simply as “Rommel” and were in awe of the German general. Monty was the first British general to appreciate the importance of what we would now term media management to a wider audience, and by consciously and deliberately marketing himself as a recognisable personality with whom the troops could identify, responded directly to the personality cult around Rommel by creating a counterpoint in himself. He also galvanised the Army in ways his predecessors Auchinleck and O’Connor, for all their achievements and tactical abilities, failed to do. By emphasising training, supplies, inter-arm battlefield co-operation and above all, morale, he told them directly, face to face that they were going to win and “there is no doubt about it.” He played to the strengths of the 8th Army and within the limitations of what could be achieved, made it an effective fighting machine; he gave it unassailable confidence in itself and in its leadership. “Montgomery’s was a double achievement”, writes Bungay, “He fought the battle the army could win, and created the army to win the battle…he had to do a lot more than Rommel, who did not have to build professional skills because the German General Staff had done that in the 1930s. Neither in fighting the battle nor in building the army was Montgomery 100% successful…but successful enough to get a decision on that battlefield and turn the army into an instrument capable of winning battles to come.”Bungay is a superb writer with an engaging, direct style, intelligent and highly literate. Often humorous and always interesting, his books are page-turners and thoroughly enjoyable. His modern management analysis skills bring new perspectives to these historic events.Among the scores of books in print on the desert campaign, Bierman and Smith’s excellent ‘Alamein: War without Hate’ which covers the entire North African campaign until the surrender of all Axis forces in Tunisia in the spring of 1943, makes an excellent companion to Bungay’s insightful analysis and can also be unconditionally recommended.

This is a battle that I have read a lot about. It was in WW2 terms, a small battle but in terms of consequences, it had major significance. It was a battle that probably Britain did not even need to fight but for their morale, they had to fight and win.Having said that for this reason much has been written on this battle but Stephen Bungay has managed to put a new twist on the battle. Whereas most people discuss the actual battle, he tends to discuss the factors that go around the battle as well eg the supply line, generalship and the respective airforce. In a very interesting way.I find myself disputing one minor point eg German air force kills where he states that on 9/01/42 Marseille shot down 17 British aircraft in one day. In fact on that day, the British lost 11 planes to all causes including AA fire. As pilots often tend to exaggerate their kills, Stephen Bungay should have been more careful in accepts such facts on face value. On the other hand I do agree with his conclusions that as the *star* German pilots tended to consider their purpose to build up scores not the mission and to some extent the German system encouraged this aim, this resulted in the German airforce not doing their mission properly.If you are looking for a book to start you off on Alamein or looking for a book to give you some new insight into this battle, this book is for you.

Stephen Bungay writes with passion and honesty, such detail and depth, a story so vividly written and explained, what drama!

for 3 years the desert war was the only arena Britain could compete against the axis on, and it needs saying how abysmally bad we were at it for most of that time. Against the italians we may have performed reasonably well but to then have the same tactics applied straight back to us by the Afrika Korps and be so inept is shaming. That our national prejudices against the character of the hun or the prussian were so strong, may not be surprising but that we projected every weakness of our own onto them is embarrassing. Whether it be tactically, or in combined arms the germans ran rings around us with imaginative quick thinking ( in case it needs making clear, we were the stolid, slow unimaginative, order obeying plodders - and in some ways remained so throughout the war on the ground). We had got to the point before Alamein where the infantry, armour and artillery had inter service trust you might more expect between the japanese army and navy. Montgomery had the sense to realise two things - if however clumsily you could take an important piece of ground then the british and commonwealth could defend it decently, - and secondly never trust armour on its own to be able to win anything. (never let it go off on its own)The one area the british army were sensible on was logistics, and maybe artillery. Histories of the desert war have needed root and branch revision for decades. Yes, a lot of peoples reputations were bound up in this but we are now getting to the point where the balance between truth and individual hurt needs to swing decisively towards truth

This book should really have been titled as a history of the North Africa campaign in the Western Desert as it provides a concise and well judged history of the campaign from its opening moves through to the pursuit of the German and Italian armies into Tunisia. Bungay writes with clarity and has a wonderfully engaging style which draws the reader in and makes the book a joy to read. His judgements and opinions are supported by clear arguments and logic and whilst never afraid to voice criticism and highlight failure is generally respectful and sympathetic towards those about whom he writes. The story of the second Alamein actually occupies a relatively small section of the book. Bungay demonstrates the importance of strategy and logistics and frequently contrasts Rommel's often brilliant tactical leadership with an almost complete failure on his part and of the Axis leadership to develop a coherent strategy in the theatre and to appreciate the realities of their ability to supply an army in North Africa. The failure to capture or at least neutralise Malta had catastrophic consequences for Rommel and the failure of the army to co-operate with the Luftwaffe scarely less so. The British on the other hand for all their tactical failures, often poor generalship and despite numerous battlefiled reverses developed army - air force co-operation and displayed a great command of logistics along with a clear strategy. As they closed the tactical gap and improved their battlefield performance the scene was set for the climactic battle of Alamein. Perhaps the best part of the book is the authors comprehensive assessment of Montgomery, few figures of history has divided opinion in the way Montgomery has and much history is divided into either hagiography or polemical character assassination. The figure that emerges in this book is of a deeply flawed human being who was really very unpleasant yet who was the right commander at the right time to command at Alamein. Montgomery transformed the fighting spirit of the 8th Army, and his attention to detail, training achievements and successes should not be discounted as a reaction to the deeply unpleasant attitudes he himself displayed to others and the self image he created. Few pictures of Montgomery are as nuanced or balanced and the book is worth buying just for this appraisal. Extremely highly recommended.

Mr Bungay writes very lucidly and with a nice balance between the overall strategic & tactical areas and the nitty gritty (this was the desert!) for the guys on the ground. I would agree with some of the other reviewers that the book covers much more than the battle itself - but that doesn't detract in my view from the enjoyment and adds much to the understanding of the wider position before and after Alamein. For more detail on the battle itself you should look elsewhere. After his superb book on the Battle of Britain and this one on that important British & Commonwealth victory, I hope he chances his mighty pen on something like the Burma Campaign….

Lucid insightful and the best description of this complex battle I have ever read. Superb analysis Stephen’s work is excellent. Probably the best historian on WW2. Can’t wait for the next book.