War As I Knew It

Good Book - Read through first few pages - has been insightful so far.

The world needs such general who has guts to tackle the problem.

I've recently bought this book. Condition and quality are decent, bought this book because of its content, and believe me it's great:). (1 star off because of the paper quality)

Loved this book ! also came in a great condition

Such an important and interesting book has been unfortunately made available to readers on the worst possible paper. Wish next addition is printed on nice quality of printing paper.

Useful and convenient.

Good book by my favorite General...

You will like it, if you like war dairies

Patton’s “War As I Knew It” is an impressive, posthumously published book (first published in 1947 after Patton's death in 1945). It's well worth the price just for Rick Atkinson’s insightful introduction (in the print book; Kindle intro by Douglas Southall Freeman) and Patton’s Letters of Instruction at the end. What follows are some quotes and commentary I gleaned from the book: Just as Lee had Stonewall Jackson, a strategist like Eisenhower had his work supplemented by a superb tactician like General George S. Patton. Patton had been a personal aide to General Pershing during WWI and had gone on to champion the use of tanks. During WWII, he was successful in the North Africa and Sicily campaigns, becoming much feared by the Germans. The Allies used Patton’s reputation to advantage during the Normandy invasion. They put Patton in charge of what amounted to a phantom army stationed near Dover, England, prompting the Germans to believe that the invasion was to come at Calais, the closest city on the other side of the Channel. This deception spread the German defense thinner at Normandy, the real target, than it otherwise would have been. Patton’s 3rd Army under General Bradley’s 12 US Army Group, became operational in Normandy on 1 August 1944 and simultaneously attacked west, east, and north, quickly trapping several hundred thousand German soldiers in an area called the Falaise (Normandy) Pocket. Aggressively employing speed, effective reconnaissance, and tactical air support, Patton’s Army moved east until it ran out of gas and halted in place. In December, the Germans took the offense with Battle of the Bulge. Resupplied and in response, Patton wheeled one part of his army north, relieved the 101st Airborne Division trapped at Bastogne, and then ran east through the frozen Ardennes, hitting the Germans in the flank. The other part of his army attacked east, with the two parts meeting to trap 60K German soldiers and 10K square miles of territory. By the time the war ended, Patton was camped in Czechoslovakia, requesting to attack Prague. Patton believed that, while there is no approved solution to any tactical situation, there is one, but only one, tactical principle which is not subject to change: “To so use the means at hand to inflict the maximum amount of wounds, death, and destruction on the enemy in the minimum time.” In battle, casualties are directly proportional to the time exposed to effective fire. One’s fire reduces the effectiveness of the enemy’s, while quickness of attack shortens the time of exposure. Battles are won by frightening the enemy, and this is best done by inflicting him with death and wounds. Fire from the rear is more deadly and three times more effective than fire from the front. To get fire behind the enemy, one must hold him by frontal fire and race around his flank. Frontal attacks against prepared positions should be avoided. One can never be too strong: one should get every man and gun possible, provided it does not unduly delay one’s attack. The larger the force and the more violence one uses in the attack, the smaller will be one’s losses. Never yield ground. Mortars and artillery are superb weapons when they are firing; when silent, they are junk – see that they keep firing! In mountain country or when forcing a pass, secure the heights first. In battle, small forces can do one of three things: go forward, halt, or run. Halting or running makes them an even easier target. There is a universal failure to repeat verbal orders back. This failure can result in grave errors. There is a tendency to overload junior officers by excessive and non-essential training and report requirements, which can be alleviated by eliminating non-essential demands. “While infantry must move to close with the enemy, it must shoot to move. When targets are not visible, infantry weapon fire must search enemy-occupied areas. Use marching fire to reduce the accuracy of enemy fire and increase one’s confidence. Shoot short. Ricochets make nastier sounds and wounds. The bayonet kills few men, but many are scared by it. Construct dummy batteries. In choosing sites for them, avoid places where fire directed at them will adversely affect other arms. The primary mission of armored units is attacking infantry and artillery. The enemy’s rear is the happy hunting ground for armor. Use every means to get it there. Against counter-attacks, the offensive use of armor striking the flank is decisive. Forward observers provide sixty-five to seventy-five percent of all artillery targets. Junior reconnaissance officers must be very inquisitive, setting an example, producing accurate reports, and not losing contact while on mission. An officer must be the last man to take shelter from fire, and the first to move forward. Similarly, he must be the last man to look after his comfort at the close of a march.” Letters of Instruction: There is only one sort of discipline – perfect discipline. Discipline can only be obtained when all officers are so imbued with the sense of their awful obligation to their men and their country that they cannot tolerate negligence. Officers who fail to correct errors or to praise excellence are valueless in peace and dangerous misfits in war. Officers must assert themselves by example and by voice. They must be pre-eminent in courage, deportment, and dress. One of the primary purposes of discipline is to produce alertness. ...ceremonies are a great help to give them that perfect discipline. Officers must possess self-confidence and the confidence of their men. Two of the best ways of producing this are meticulously conducted close-order drill, led by officers, and platoon marches...during which the platoon is wholly on its own. Combat principles: A pint of sweat will save a gallon of blood! “Catch the enemy by the nose with fire and kick him in the pants with fire emplaced through movement.” Hit hard soon; you can never be too strong. Get every man and gun you can secure, provided it does not unduly delay your attack. Officers must possess self-confidence and the confidence of their men. German prisoners over forty talk more quickly than the younger ones. To halt under fire is folly. To halt under fire and not fire back is suicide. Move forward out of fire. Officers must set an example. If you cannot see the enemy, you can at least shoot at the place where he is apt to be. Bottom line, a fascinating read from the pen of one of history’s great captains!Check out some of William J. Bahr’s books: Strategy Pure and Simple: Essential Moves for Winning in Competition and Cooperation andGeorge Washington's Liberty Key: Mount Vernon's Bastille Key – the Mystery and Magic of Its Body, Mind, and Soul, a best-seller at Mount Vernon. “Character is Key for Liberty!”

Exactly as expected.

This man was indeed a genius in war!! His courage and strength and vitality to win campaigns were amazing, and his outspokenness were what made him so strong in opinion. He was America' s finest.

映画「パットン大戦車軍団」のノリを期待していたのですが、パットン将軍の日記を編集し直し、本にしたようです。　北アフリカ戦線やシシリーの部分は少しの記述しかなく、戦闘場面もあまりありません。　大半がＥＴＯ（オーバーロード作戦）のことなのですが、「第○師団（○の部分は数字）の○○少将が云々」と言う記述がやたらに多く（←とにかく数え切れないくらいの師団等名・将校等名前がでてきますよの意味です）、はっきり言って訳がわからなくなります。よほどの戦術研究家か専門家でないと全体像を掴むのは困難です（米国人は理解できる人も多いでしょうが、日本人ではＥＴＯに関して、そこまで詳しく戦術を研究しているのは、防衛庁の防衛研究所か、かなりのオタクです）。　また、附属の地図もかなり見にくいため、余計に読む気力が萎えて来ます。　私の英語能力が低いのも原因ではありますが「Band of Brothers」のようなストーリー性を求める読者にはお薦め出来ません。

Good book, right out of the horse's mouth. Nothing better than this.